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Abstract—This comparison of cybercrime offenders within and
outside the workplace reveals they display very different types of
offending behaviour, involving different demographics, initiation
pathways, and types of offence. The Cambridge Computer Crime
Database (CCCD) is a database of open source information about
cybercrime arrests and prosecutions in the United Kingdom. This
study analyses data from the CCCD spanning nine years, from
1 January 2010 to 31 December 2018. Insiders are more likely
to be older, and commit less-technical offences, primarily data
and system breaches. They are less likely to offend with others,
the offences are less likely to be international in nature, and
they are less likely to receive a custodial sentence. Most alleged
offenders are men, but women are more likely to offend within
their occupation than outside the workplace. Of those that offend
in the workplace, the largest group consists of police officers or
police staff. This is likely to reflect differences in the type of
organisations that pursue criminal action against insiders. We
draw on a strain theory framework to argue that these findings
accord with different kinds of strain and differing reactions
to strain. The data for crimes outside the workplace support
a ‘subcultural’ pattern of adaptation to strain, with offenders
tending to be younger, male and linked to co-offenders. The
findings relating to insiders support an opportunity model of
crime, with inter-workplace variation in opportunities, working
cultures and sources of strain present in different workplaces.
Index Terms—Computer crime, white collar crime, cyber-
crime, offending in the workplace
I. INTRODUCTION
Cybercrime includes a variety of different types of offences,
including gaining unauthorised access to a computer system
with or without a further criminal motive, fraud, denial of
service attacks, and the development and supply of malware.
The cybercrimes included within the scope of this article
involve networked computer systems, including the Internet, as
well as local networks. This article provides a contemporary,
quantitative analytical approach to cybercrime, comparing
those that are committed by insiders to those that take place
outside the workplace.
A. Cybercrime in the workplace–a form of white collar crime?
Early criminological research into cybercrimes classified
them as a form of white collar crime. This is most likely
because at the time computers were mainly only available in
the workplace [1]. Sutherland, who coined the term ‘white
collar crime’, defined it as a ‘crime committed by a person
of respectability and high social status in the course of his
occupation’ [2, p. 7].
Nowadays, the issue as to whether cybercrimes are white
collar crimes can be contentious. Sutherland excluded from
his definition offenders who did not hold a high social status,
including ‘wealthy members of the underworld’ [2, p. 7].
Since then, the definition of white collar crime has expanded
considerably, with Friedrichs [3, p. 211] defining some types
of ‘technocrime’ as a marginal form of white collar crime, and
Rosoff, Pontell and Tilman [4, p. 488] referring to cybercrime
offences committed by juveniles as ‘white collar delinquency’.
On the other hand, Chan [1] asserts that not all cyber-
crimes can be classified as white collar crimes, particularly
unauthorised access. In the 1980s, computers became more
widely available to the general public, as did the opportunity
to commit cybercrime [5]. This raises the question as to
whether cybercrime is a component of white collar crime;
or conversely, whether the increasing use of computers in
the workplace means that we should rethink this taxonomy,
perhaps even classifying white collar crime as a class of
cybercrime. The increasing prevalence of digital technology
means more offending in the workplace is likely to involve
computers [6], [7]. Workplace offenders may not necessarily
be of high social status, but the availability of new technologies
provides many opportunities for innovation at work, both
criminal and legitimate.
B. Cybercrime–offender and offence characteristics
Many cybercrimes (as well as crimes more generally) are
committed by young men [8]–[12]. However, these charac-
teristics may actually differ for offences committed in the
workplace. For example, an analysis of misuse of computer
systems in the Australian public sector found that all suspects
were over the age of 34 [13]. Similarly, Clark [14] found that
the average age of insiders who had committed cybercrime
offences within US companies was 38, and the oldest was 65.
This indicates that age of offenders is likely to vary in line
with opportunities afforded by the seniority of employees.
Women are also involved in fraud to a greater extent than
many other types of crime [15], [16]. Researchers have found
that compared to men, women offenders in the workplace are
less likely to hold a senior position [17], [18]. While men are
likely to commit the majority of cybercrime offences overall,
women cybercrime offenders may be more likely to offend in,
rather than outside, the workplace.
The type of cybercrime that is committed may also relate
to presented opportunities, as well as the offender’s pathway
into crime. Hutchings [19] found two different pathways for
cybercrime offenders, the ‘general’ and ‘technical’ pathways.
Those that follow the ‘general’ pathway are more likely to
have experienced particular kinds of strain, such as economic
or employment problems, mental health issues, or addictions.
They primarily operate alone, but their methods may be
inspired by other previous offenders.
Strain theory posits that some kinds of offending can be
explained by the inability of individuals to attain widely-held
social goals, such as wealth or social status. This experience of
strain then leads to them seeking deviant or criminal modes of
attaining these goals. Agnew’s General Strain Theory extends
this into a systematic framework which includes other sources
of strain, and factors which may make individuals more or less
likely to cope with this strain through criminal offending [20].
Although initially developed to explain offending by eco-
nomically disadvantaged social groups [21], [22], this frame-
work has more recently been used by Agnew and others
to explain white-collar offending [20], [23], [24]. White-
collar offending is primarily associated with the blockage
of economic goals, especially where there is a perceived
injustice on the part of the offender, the presence or threat of
economic problems, and work-related stress and dissatisfaction
[20]. Some individuals facing these strains attempt to mitigate
them, or to achieve their blocked goals, by innovative means.
When presented with the opportunity for crime, such as in the
workplace, this innovation can include lawbreaking.
Those that follow the technical pathway identified by Hutch-
ings [19] share different characteristics. They tend to offend
outside work, primarily operate with others, and their pathway
to offending is through associations with others, on and off-
line. Through these associations, individuals learn the tech-
niques to commit cybercrime, as well as share the definitions
and techniques of neutralisation that justify or excuse their
behaviours to themselves and enable offending to occur [19].
The types of strain, and the deviant coping mechanisms
offenders may use to mitigate it, are likely to differ for
those committing crime in-work and those doing so outside
the workplace. For example, those committing crime outside
work may be more likely to become involved through the
need or desire for social status and monetary gain which
they feel blocked from achieving within conventional society.
According to subcultural theories of crime, deviant subcultures
provide alternative systems of social status within which
they are able to achieve these goals. In both cases, status
and monetary goals are relative–offenders see themselves as
blocked from attaining their goals by legitimate means, and so
seek out deviant means of attaining them [22], [25]. Online
subcultures, often organised around webforums, often feature
in cybercrime–these communities are used for learning and
sharing ideologies, recruitment, and trading tools [26]. Thus,
this represents a different kind of strain, and a different method
of mitigation, from the at-work offenders.
For offending in the workplace, it is likely that offence types
and their methods correspond with presented opportunity.
To illustrate, the technical pathway would see ‘unauthorised
access’ or ‘hacking’ carried out with the use of malware or
code injection. Alternatively, general methods include ‘shoul-
der surfing’, solely employing social engineering techniques,
or misusing legitimate access to a computer system [14],
[19], [27], [28]. Opportunities for the latter are abundant
in the workplace [28]. Insiders may obtain employment at
a targeted organisation, be recruited by those attempting to
commit offences, abuse their access as the result of becom-
ing discontent in their employment, or become tempted by
presented opportunities and the potential perceived gains.
Cybercrimes may also differ according to the extent they
cross borders. Leukfeldt et al. [29] analysed police files re-
lating to Dutch criminal investigations and also identified two
distinct groups of cybercrime offenders. They call these ‘low-
tech all rounders’ and ‘high tech specialists’, which broadly
correspond to the ‘general’ and ‘technical’ offenders identified
by Hutchings [19]. They found that that low-tech networks are
more likely to incorporate offenders within the same country,
and to target local victims, while high-tech networks are more
international in nature.
The international nature of the Internet globalises crime, risk
and criminal opportunity in complex ways. Offenders in one or
more jurisdictions, targeting victims in multiple countries, can
commit offences using infrastructure located somewhere en-
tirely different. The requirement for police cooperation across
multiple countries can make cross-border cases particularly
hard to pursue [30]. Therefore, offences committed locally
may be more likely to be investigated and prosecuted.
C. Sentencing outcomes
We also compare sentencing outcomes for cybercrime inside
and outside the workplace. This is important because sentenc-
ing practices play a key role in establishing how different
kinds of criminal behaviour are perceived and constructed.
In particular, media reporting on sentencing for white-collar
crimes shapes which kinds of workplace fraud or malpractice
become labelled as criminal or reported in practice [31]. The
use of imprisonment has important consequences for equality
and social justice, and can itself cause the further entrenchment
of offending behaviour through increasing strain [32].
There is a substantial criminological literature on sentenc-
ing, which suggests that disposals tend to vary based on the
age, gender, social class of the offender, and the nature of
offence [33]–[35]. Use of technical skills, breach of trust,
and effects on victims have all been found to be factors in
sentencing for cybercrime [36]. Given the characteristics of
these offences described above, we would therefore expect to
see a disparity in sentencing between cybercrime offending
inside and outside the workplace.
D. Reporting insider abuse and workplace type
Insiders can be committing a crime if they access data with-
out authorisation. Insider offences include crimes committed
by those who do have authorisation to the computer system,
but use that access for unauthorised purposes [37]. This
can include access by employees, contractors, consultants,
suppliers, and others situated within a workplace [38].
Despite unauthorised access being a crime, it is likely
that many employers do not report internal misuse to police.
Isenring et al. [39] found that in Switzerland, only 29.3%
of the commercial sector and 9.5% of the financial sector
report crimes committed by employees to the police. The
main reasons for not reporting included reimbursement of the
damage by the offender, a lack of evidence, the offence not
being serious, and the dismissal of the employee. While the
survey did not ask about unauthorised access to computer
systems, it did include a category for ‘violations of company
secrecy’, which were least likely to be reported to police.
Organisations are most likely to report employee offences
when they experience a high level of financial loss.
A reason for not reporting may be concerns about reputation
damage. Commercial providers are usually operating in a com-
petitive environment–for example, we can choose with which
bank to open an account (although this may be constrained by
the availability of bank branches in our area). However, we not
only pay for goods and services using financial capital, but also
personal information. Our bank knows our income, what we
spend it on, where, and when. It can see regular patterns in our
expenditure, allowing for the monitoring of routine activities,
and perhaps even prediction of future behaviours. Such data
allow the bank to detect fraudulent transactions, but may also
of interest for a variety of investigatory, marketing, and even
criminal, purposes. Companies have an incentive to ensure that
their reputation is maintained, to attract and retain customers.
In comparison, individuals have little choice when it comes
to governments holding data about them, including school,
taxation, health, and council records. There are often particular
sensitivities with government-held data. For example, victims
who report experiences of crime to the police may be particu-
larly vulnerable. There is also an element of coercion relating
to data about those suspected of committing crime. Under the
UK’s Investigatory Powers Act 2016, intelligence agencies and
law enforcement can carry out targeted and bulk interception
of communications, and bulk collection of communications
data. Privacy International allege this data has been accessed
improperly, with databases being treated ‘like Facebook’ to
check on birthdays and family members [40].
In this study, data regarding cybercrimes are analysed to test
hypothesised relationships with respect to offender characteris-
tics (age and gender), offence characteristics (offence type and
nature, international aspects, and involvement of co-offenders),
and sentencing outcomes. Workplace type is also examined,
to explore which types of organisations report insiders who
misuse their computer systems to the police.
II. HYPOTHESES
We argue that cybercrime offending inside and out of
the workplace represent two different categories of criminal
behaviour. They tend to enrol different kinds of offenders,
demonstrate different pathways to initiation, and involve dif-
ferent types of offences. Drawing from the research literature,
we hypothesise that if cybercrime outside the workplace were
characterised by subcultural adaptations to strain (such as not
achieving social status), offenders would be likely to demon-
strate certain characteristics. For example, they would likely
be younger, more likely to be men (due to the misogynistic
culture of many of these communities [8]), more likely to
involve co-offending, and more likely to be international. If,
equally, workplace cybercrime fits the model of white-collar
strain, one would expect a much higher proportion of women,
more opportunity-based crime, and more solo offenders.
We test these relationships through the following hypothe-
ses. The first six test the bivariate relationships between
cybercrime offending in and out of the workplace and offender
and offence characteristics. The seventh and eighth hypothe-
ses relate to sentencing outcomes, namely the relationship
between receiving a custodial sentence, and sentence length,
with cybercrime offending in and out of the workplace. The
hypothesised direction of these relationships are:
H1: Cybercrimes in the workplace involve significantly
older alleged offenders than cybercrimes outside the
workplace
H2: Cybercrimes in the workplace are significantly more
likely to involve women alleged offenders than cy-
bercrimes outside the workplace
H3: Cybercrimes in the workplace are significantly more
likely to be general, rather than technical, than cy-
bercrimes outside the workplace
H4: Cybercrimes in the workplace involve different types
of offences than cybercrimes outside the workplace
H5: Cybercrimes in the workplace are significantly less
likely to involve international aspects than cyber-
crimes outside the workplace
H6: Cybercrimes in the workplace are significantly less
likely to involve alleged co-offenders than cyber-
crimes outside the workplace
H7: Cybercrimes in the workplace are significantly less
likely to receive a custodial sentence than cyber-
crimes outside the workplace
H8: Cybercrimes in the workplace receive a significantly
shorter custodial sentence than cybercrimes outside
the workplace
For the benefit of those unfamiliar with hypothesis testing, a
statistically significant finding does not ‘prove’ that a relation-
ship exists, but rather provides support for such a relationship.
In addition to testing the hypothesis set out above, we use
multivariate approaches to confirm the bivariate analyses are
not spurious. We also explore the employment sector that
cybercrimes in the workplace are from, specifically private
organisations, policing agencies, and other public bodies.
III. METHOD
The data for this research are drawn from the Cambridge
Computer Crime Database (CCCD), which records cyber-
crime events in the UK where someone has been arrested,
charged, and/or prosecuted [41]. The database, which is up-
dated weekly, contains 736 entries for 1 January 2010 to 31
December 2018, the period covered for this research. The
data in the CCCD are obtained from the public domain. They
are harvested from news media, as well as media releases
from UK police forces. The database can be accessed from:
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/∼ah793/cccd.html
The CCCD contains cases that are broadly classified as
cybercrime offences, including those that fall under the Com-
puter Misuse Act 1990. The database also includes cybercrimes
that fall under other legislation. This includes fraud, conspir-
acy, misconduct in a public office, and money laundering
offences. Offences that are solely of an interpersonal nature,
such as online stalking or harassment, accessing child sexual
exploitation material, or online grooming, are not included
(although the compromise of computer systems for these
purposes, such as gaining access to a victim’s email or social
media account, are). Also excluded are copyright or online
piracy offences, the online sale of illicit, counterfeit or stolen
products, or offences where the only computer connection is
online planning or communication.
It is difficult to confirm whether the CCCD is exhaustive.
This is because offences are usually counted according to
the relevant legislation. Many cybercrime cases have not
been prosecuted under the Computer Misuse Act 1990, but
under other legislation such as the Fraud Act 2006 or the
Data Protection Act 1998. Other cases tried under these Acts
have little relevance to cybercrime. However, it appears that
cybercrime is newsworthy, and many cases are reported in
the public domain. Therefore, it is expected that the database
provides good coverage of relevant cases.
Of the 736 entries in the CCCD, 34 cases (4.6%) were
acquitted or the charges were dropped. These are removed
for this analysis, leaving 702 cases. Of these, 522 (74.4%)
are considered to be finalised (e.g. sentenced, pleaded or
found guilty), while another 180 (25.6%) are unfinalised (e.g.
arrested, charged, awaiting trial, or outcome unknown). As
we analyse these cases together, the term ‘alleged offender’
is used to cover cases that are unfinalised, as well as where
there has been a conviction, as those in the former category
are innocent until proven guilty.
The cases were categorised as to whether or not the offence
allegedly took place during or after a course of employment
(the dependent variable). This includes offences against a
current or former employer, or another individual or business,
such as a competitor (excluding setting up a business for the
purpose of committing an offence). Sixty-seven cases were
excluded, as there was not enough information to enable
categorisation. Of the remaining 635 cases, 149 (23.5%) were
alleged to have occurred in the workplace.
The independent variables are described as follows:
1) Age: Age at time of arrest or most recent court appear-
ance is known for 602 cases (85.8%), and ranges from 14
to 69 years. The average age is 32.1 years, with a standard
deviation of 10.7 years.
2) Gender: Of the 648 cases where gender is known, 530
(81.8%) are men, and 118 (18.2%) are women.
3) General/technical: This captures whether or not the
offence requires a particular skill set or knowledge about
computer systems. Thirty-six cases are excluded, as there
was not enough information to enable categorisation. Of the
remaining 666 cases, 358 (53.8%) are categorised as ‘general’
and 308 (46.2%) are categorised as ‘technical’.
4) Offence type: Of the 702 cases, 47 cases were excluded
as there was not enough information to enable categorisation.
The categories are malware (n=112), data or system breach
(n=202), denial of service attacks (n=53), fraud (n=190), and
money laundering (n=98). Hardware keyloggers and keyboard,
video and mouse (KVM) devices are classified under malware.
This category also includes developing, testing of, or providing
guides relating to the use of malware.
5) International aspects: This category is coded ‘yes’ if
there was an international co-offender, if they had travelled
to the UK to target victims, if they had targeted victims
outside of the UK, or had been extradited to the UK. This
does not include using cloud services or forums that may be
offshore. Of the 645 cases with enough information to enable
categorisation, 151 (23.4%) have an international aspect.
6) Co-offending: Of the 702 cases, 471 (67.1%) were
alleged to have taken place with at least one co-offender, and
231 (32.9%) involved sole alleged offenders.
7) Custodial sentence: Of the 505 cases where the sentence
is known, 305 (60.4%) received a custodial sentence, and 200
(39.6%) received a non-custodial or suspended sentence.
8) Sentence length: The sentence length has been summed
for the few repeat offenders. For those that received custodial
sentences, the average sentence length is 3.6 years (SD=2.6).
Sentences range in length from 10 weeks, to 16 years.
As well as analysing the data quantitatively, qualitative
narratives have been extracted to illustrate and add context
to the research findings.
IV. RESULTS
Hypothesis 1: Relationship between age and offending in the
workplace
As is common with offender populations, the distribution is
positively skewed, with the majority of cases being younger, as
shown in Figure 1. As age is not normally distributed, a Mann-
Whitney U test is used to examine the relationship between
age and offending in the workplace. As shown in Figure 2, a
significant difference is found. Those alleged to have offended
in the workplace are generally older (M=37.1, SD=10.3) than
those who are alleged to have committed offences outside
the workplace (M=30.5, SD=10.2, U=17418.0, p<.001), in
support of the first hypothesis.
Fig. 1. Age distribution
Fig. 2. Age distribution for offending in the course of employment (yes/no)
The ages of those offending in the workplace ranged from
21 to 63. The eldest, a former employee of a community-
based counselling charity, pleaded guilty to three offences
under section 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998. He had sent
information relating to vulnerable clients to his personal email
address on 11 occasions over a period of eight months. The
data included full names, dates of birth, telephone numbers and
medical information of 183 people, including three children.
One of the youngest, at 21 years, pleaded guilty to five
counts of unauthorised access to computer material, an offence
under the Computer Misuse Act 1990. She had been a secre-
tary at a county council, where she had accessed extremely
sensitive data relating to a victim of child sexual abuse and
provided it to her boyfriend, who was one of those accused
of the abuse.
Hypothesis 2: Relationship between gender and offending in
the workplace
A Chi-Square test of independence is used to examine the
relationship between gender and offending in the workplace.
As shown in Table I, the relationship between these variables
is significant (χ2(1, N=617)=26.05, p<.001). A standardised
residual of +/- 2 indicates a cell has a significantly greater,
or lesser, than expected frequency [42]. The standardised
residuals (highlighted in colour, with blue indicating a greater
than expected frequency, and red a lesser than expected fre-
quency) indicate that the women are more likely than expected
to offend in the workplace. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is also
supported.
TABLE I
CONTINGENCY TABLE FOR OFFENDING IN THE WORKPLACE AND GENDER
(EXPECTED FREQUENCIES ARE SHOWN IN PARENTHESIS)
Course of employment Gender Total
Male Female
No 404 (382.4) 67 (88.6) 471
Std. Res 1.1 Std. Res -2.3
Yes 97 (118.6) 49 (27.4) 146





CONTINGENCY TABLE FOR OFFENDING IN THE WORKPLACE AND
OFFENCE TYPE (EXPECTED FREQUENCIES ARE SHOWN IN PARENTHESIS)
Course of employment Offence type Total
General Technical
No 209 (256.3) 269 (221.7) 478
Std. Res -3.0 Std. Res 3.2
Yes 124 (76.7) 19 (66.3) 143




One of the largest groups of co-offenders included 21
people. Seven were women, and five offended in the course
of their employment. The group targeted corporate bank-
ing customers by purporting to be from their bank. Using
technology to disguise the number they were calling from–
making the phone number appear to be a legitimate bank–they
duped customers into revealing personal banking information,
allowing them to gain access to their accounts. They then
transferred money into ‘mule accounts’ under their control,
and withdrew money from ATMs and bank branches across
the country. Of the seven women, five had not offended in
the workplace, and instead had committed money laundering
offences. The other two were colleagues and sisters, aged just
22 and 24. They worked in the same bank as customer service
assistants. They were paid £250 for every bank statement that
they provided to the other group members. They both pleaded
guilty to conspiracy to commit fraud by abuse of position.
Hypothesis 3: Relationship between general/technical offences
and offending in the workplace
A Chi-Square test of independence is performed to examine
the relationship between offence type and offending in the
workplace. As shown in Table II, and in support of hypoth-
esis 3, the relationship between these variables is significant
(χ2(1, N=621)=80.08, p<.001). Offences that take place in
the workplace are more likely to be general in nature, such
as misuse of legitimate access, and offences that take place
outside the workplace are more likely to be technical.
Hypothesis 4: Relationship between offence type and offending
in the workplace
A Chi-Square test of independence is used to examine the
relationship between offence category and offending in the
TABLE III
CONTINGENCY TABLE FOR OFFENDING IN THE WORKPLACE AND OFFENCE
CATEGORY (EXPECTED FREQUENCIES ARE SHOWN IN PARENTHESIS)
Offence category Course of employment Total
No Yes
Malware 100 (81.7) 7 (25.3) 107
Std. Res 2.0 Std. Res -3.6
Data or system breach 71 (149.6) 125 (46.4) 196
Std. Res -6.4 Std. Res 11.5
Denial of service attack 39 (30.5) 1 (9.5) 40
Std. Res 1.5 Std. Res -2.8
Fraud 170 (140.4) 14 (43.6) 184
Std. Res 2.5 Std. Res -4.5
Money laundering 97 (74.8) 1 (23.2) 98





CONTINGENCY TABLE FOR OFFENDING IN THE WORKPLACE AND
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS (EXPECTED FREQUENCIES IN PARENTHESIS)
Course of employment International Total
No Yes
No 309 (342.0) 147 (114.0) 456
Std. Res -1.8 Std. Res 3.1
Yes 141 (108.0) 3 (36.0) 144




workplace. In support of hypothesis 4, the relationship is
significant (χ2(4, N=625)=255.81, p<.001) (see Table III).
Cybercrimes in the workplace are significantly more likely
to be classified as data or system breaches, and significantly
less likely to be classified in any of the other categories. Con-
versely, cybercrimes outside of the workplace are significantly
less likely to be classified as data or system breaches.
A KVM device is a piece of hardware that can be installed
on a machine to allow remote access. KVM devices have been
used in a number of bank frauds resulting in prosecution in the
UK. In one example a bank clerk was caught on CCTV footage
accompanying an unidentified man into a customer interview
room at the branch. The man inserted the KVM device into
a computer, providing access to the bank’s systems. Deposits
totalling more than £1m were made into genuine customer
accounts, and money was then withdrawn, although most was
recovered. The 24-year-old bank clerk was found guilty of
fraud by abuse of a position of trust.
Hypothesis 5: Relationship between international aspects and
offending in the workplace
A Chi-Square test of independence is performed to examine
the relationship between offending in the workplace and
international aspects. As shown in Table IV, the relationship
between these variables is significant (χ2(1, N=600)=51.47,
p<.001). Only three of the cybercrimes in the workplace
have an international aspect, while cybercrimes outside the
workplace are significantly more likely to cross borders.
One of the three cases with international aspects involved
the owner of the business, which provided payday loans. He
hired people in America to sabotage a consumer rights website
after it had carried customers’ complaints about his business.
He tracked down potential attackers on an online forum, and
paid one to try to take the website down, although it did not
work. He also paid £2,000 for denial of service attacks against
the websites of competitors. He pleaded guilty to five charges
of commissioning the attacks.
The other two international cases involved colleagues at
a bank who were linked with co-offenders based in Eastern
Europe, as well as in the UK. Both employees pleaded guilty.
The offences spanned multiple years, during which they had
helped launder funds. The money had been stolen using
malware sent via email attachment, which allowed remote
access to victims’ devices and recorded their bank details. The
younger of the two had opened 105 of the 199 accounts used
to transfer money from a series of UK companies. He also
occasionally changed the details of 143 of the 199 accounts.
The other had also opened a large number of mule accounts,
and had over £16,000 in cash and nine mobile phones hidden
in his house. In total, the group laundered more than £16m.
Hypothesis 6: Relationship between co-offending and offend-
ing in the workplace
A Chi-Square test of independence is used to examine
the relationship between co-offending and offending in the
workplace. As shown in Table VII, the relationship between
these variables is significant (χ2(1, N=635)=69.29, p<.001).
Cybercrimes in the workplace are significantly more likely to
involve a single alleged offender, while cybercrimes outside
the workplace are more likely to involve multiple people.
Multivariate analyses
We include the variables used for hypotheses 1–3, 5 and
6 (excluding offence type as it has multiple categories) in a
forced entry logistic regression analysis to see if the differ-
ences disappear when controls for the other variables are used.
This allows us to check if any of the relationships are spurious.
After excluding 185 cases with missing data, 517 cases were
available for analysis: 117 cases where the alleged offender
was an insider, and 400 cases where they were allegedly to
have offended outside the workplace. Without any independent
variables in the model, 77.4% of cases were correctly predicted
to have not involved insiders (-2LL=554.6).
The full model was significantly improved with all pre-
dictor variables (-2LL=376.6) and was statistically better
at predicting if the alleged offender was an insider (χ2(5,
N=517)=176.4, p<.001). The full model accounts for between
28.9 and 44.0% of the variance and accurately predicts 85.3%
of cases. Of the offences that involved insiders, the model
accurately predicts 95.3%.
Table V shows regression coefficients, Wald statistics, odds
ratios, and 95% confidence intervals for odds ratios for each
of the five predictors. All the variables make a significant
contribution to the model.
TABLE V
LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL FOR OFFENDING IN THE WORKPLACE
95% C.I. for Exp(B)
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper
Age .051 .012 18.542 .000 1.053 1.028 1.078
Gender .969 .312 9.668 .002 2.635 1.431 4.852
Co-offender -1.191 .275 18.823 .000 .304 .177 .520
Offence type -1.824 .313 34.022 .000 .161 .087 .298
International -2.768 .625 19.620 .000 .063 .018 .214
(Constant) -1.435 .482 8.879 .003 .238
TABLE VI
MAIN CRIME CATEGORIES IN AND OUT OF THE WORKPLACE
Inside the workplace Percentage
Men, data breach, solo 31.7%
Men, data breach, co-offending 22.1%
Women, data breach, solo 18.6%
Women, data breach, co-offending 11.7%
Outside the workplace Percentage
Men, fraud, co-offending 23.9%
Men, malware, co-offending 15.9%
Men, money laundering, co-offending 14.8%
Men, breach, co-offending 7.6%
The odds ratios indicate that for each additional year of age,
the odds the offence took place in the workplace increase by
1.05. If the alleged offender is a woman, the odds the offence
was in the workplace increase by 2.64. Having a co-offender,
the offence being technical in nature, and having international
aspects, each decrease the odds that a cybercrime took place
in a workplace by a factor of .30, .16 and .06, respectively.
In Table VI the data is grouped into the four most common
categories according to the offender’s gender, the type of
crime, and whether it was a solo or group offence. This allows
us to further explore differences in types of offending. Of
offences committed outside the workplace, the four main cate-
gories observed were men committing fraud with co-offenders
(23.9%), men committing malware offences with co-offenders
(15.9%), men laundering money with co-offenders (14.8%),
and men committing data breaches with co-offenders (7.6%).
We argue, therefore, that cybercrime committed outside the
workplace is likely to be characterised by deviant subcultural
association as a response to strain.
Inside the workplace, the four main categories were men
committing data breaches alone (31.7%) and with co-offenders
(22.1%), and women committing data breaches alone (18.6%)
and with co-offenders (11.7%). This supports the idea that
offenders in the workplace may involve a more opportunity-
based form of initiation. This further evidences a clear distinc-
tion in patterns of cybercrime offending in-work and outside
of the workplace.
Hypothesis 7: Relationship between offending in the workplace
and receiving a custodial sentence
A Chi-Square test of independence is used to examine the
relationship between offending in the workplace and receiving
a custodial sentence. As shown in Table VIII, the relationship
between these variables is significant (χ2(1, N=499)=32.72,
TABLE VII
CONTINGENCY TABLE FOR OFFENDING IN THE WORKPLACE AND
CO-OFFENDING (EXPECTED FREQUENCIES ARE SHOWN IN PARENTHESIS)
Course of employment Co-offender Total
No Yes
No 100 (140.8) 386 (345.2) 486
Std. Res -3.4 Std. Res 2.2
Yes 84 (43.2) 65 (105.8) 149





CONTINGENCY TABLE FOR OFFENDING IN THE WORKPLACE AND
SENTENCE TYPE (EXPECTED FREQUENCIES ARE SHOWN IN PARENTHESIS)
Course of employment Sentence type Total
Non-custodial/Suspended Custodial
No 115 (143.3) 248 (219.7) 363
Std. Res -2.4 Std. Res 1.9
Yes 82 (53.7) 54 (82.3) 136




p<.001). Cybercrimes in the workplace are significantly more
likely to receive a non-custodial or suspended sentence.
Hypothesis 8: Relationship between offending in the workplace
and length of sentence
As shown in Figure 3, the distribution is positively skewed,
with the majority receiving relatively shorter sentences. A
Mann-Whitney U test finds that the length of sentence is
not significantly different from those that offend outside the
workplace (U=5846.0, p=.144). Therefore, hypothesis 8 is not
supported. The distributions are shown in Figure 4.
The longest sentence was 16 years. This was handed down
to a 48-year-old police officer who admitted four counts of
conspiracy to commit misconduct in a public office, two counts
of conspiracy to steal, conspiracy to possess Class A drugs
with intent to supply, and conspiracy to possess Class B
drugs with intent to supply. He had accessed police computer
systems to feed information to a number of criminal asso-
ciates. An investigation revealed he had been accessing police
Fig. 3. Sentence length distribution (months)
Fig. 4. Sentence length (months) for offending in the course of employment
(yes/no)
computer systems and leaking intelligence and information to
some of his co-accused from 2011 to 2017.
Type of organisation
The cybercrimes categorised as taking place in the work-
place are further analysed to determine the type of organisa-
tion involved. Almost half (n=74, 49.7%) were from private
organisations, including 19 (12.8%) who worked for banks or
financial institutions and 6 (4.0%) who worked for insurance
companies. Police employees (officers and staff) accounted for
34.2% (n=51), those who worked for health services, including
GPs, hospitals and mental health service providers accounted
for 8.7% (n=13), and 7.4% (n=11) were from other public
bodies, such as the tax office, schools, or local authorities.
As shown in Table IX, these patterns can be further dis-
tinguished by offender and offence characteristics. In private
sector organisations, data breaches by men, both solo (29%)
and with co-offenders (35%), made up the large majority
of crimes, with data breaches by women (6% for solo and
co-offenders) and fraud offences by men (6% solo and co-
offenders) the next most common offences. In the police,
data breaches were similarly prominent, though more likely
to include solo male offenders (52%) and women offenders
(18% solo, 14% co-offending), with men offending with
others making up only 14%. In health and other public sector
organisations, data breaches by solo women offenders were
much more likely (63%), with data breaches by solo men
the next most likely offender type (25%). Finally, for those
working in banking or insurance, while data breaches by men
or women co-offenders were still the highest category (26%
for each), fraud, money-laundering and malware offences were
much more likely than for other organisation type. The split in
offence categories between these different types of workplace
is likely to be due to a combination of a number of factors.
These include differences in: opportunities for offending in the
workplace; experiences of strain and control factors (including
different workplace cultures); and demographic profiles for
those employed in certain types of organisations.
Policing agencies have unique opportunities for crime, and
may become targets due to the type of data they hold. For
example, two police staff (a man and a woman) were found
guilty of conspiracy to commit misconduct in a public office.
They had attempted to uncover the name of a protected witness
who had given evidence at the trial of a ‘gangland execution’,
where two men had been found guilty. The woman was the
girlfriend of one of the two jailed, and he was appealing
the conviction. He had been sentenced in November 2011
and she started working for the police in January 2012. Two
months later, she made her first attempt to unlawfully gather
information from the police systems. However, she did not
have access to the criminal intelligence system, which contains
highly confidential information. She enlisted the help of (and
started a relationship with) her male co-offender, who did
have access. He made numerous unauthorised attempts to
discover the identity of the protected witness and others, and
the information gathered was passed on.
In the private sector, financial institutions are a particular
target for cybercriminals. A number of examples have already
been provided about bank employees committing cybercrimes
in order to facilitate other offences. These cases are notable
due to the large monetary values and number of co-offenders
involved. In another case, a former bank manager was alleged
to have printed off confidential customer information, images
of customer signatures, and supplied them to unknown others
for fraud purposes. While the original charges were dropped,
she pleaded guilty to breaching the Data Protection Act 1998
by illegally possessing an image of one customer’s signature.
We note this case follows a similar method to others involving
bank insiders, and it is not known to us if they are connected.
V. CONCLUSION
Within the CCCD, cybercrimes outside the workplace out-
number offences committed during the course of, or shortly
after, employment. However, this does not mean that offences
are less likely to occur during the course of employment; it
may be that employers are less likely to pursue police action
for their employees’ wrongdoings, and instead resolve these
internally. This may also depend on the type of organisation,
with police appearing to take a harder stance against illegal
access to their databases than private organisations in practice.
The type of workplace offence most likely to be prosecuted
is unauthorised access to computer data and systems, a crime
type that corresponds with the type of opportunities present
in the workplace. As data or system breaches themselves
may not create an immediate financial loss to the victimised
organisation, a factor that Isenring et al. [39] found was related
to organisations being less likely to report to police, it is likely
that this is underreported. In addition to financial impact, there
may be other reasons for the reluctance to report cybercrimes
in particular. These include reputational loss, the time lost to
police investigation, and the loss of computers for forensic
and evidentiary requirements. Understanding these limitations
further may be useful, particularly for identifying ways to
encourage businesses to report employee offending by making
the process as straightforward as possible. Police may engage
in outreach with organisations to demonstrate that they will
pursue these types of offences, and could develop streamlined
TABLE IX
MAIN CRIME CATEGORIES IN DIFFERENT WORKPLACES




Women, breach, co-offending 6.3% 26.0% 14.0% 4.0%
Women, breach, solo 6.3% 0.0% 18.0% 63.0%
Women, fraud, co-offending 0.0% 9.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Women, fraud, solo 2.1% 4.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Women, malware, cooffending 0.0% 4.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Women, money laundering, co-offending 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Men, breach, co-offending 35.4% 26.0% 14.0% 8.0%
Men, breach, solo 29.2% 0.0% 52.0% 25.0%
Men, DDoS, co-offending 2.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Men, DDoS, solo-offending 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Men, fraud, co-offending 6.3% 9.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Men, fraud, solo-offending 6.3% 9.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Men, malware, co-offending 2.1% 9.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Men, malware, solo-offending 4.2% 0.0% 2.0% 0.0%
Men, money laundering, co-offending 0.0% 4.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
procedures so that victimised organisations suffer as little
downtime as possible during the course of an investigation.
Furthermore, incentives to report, such being able to claim
on insurance policies, may be forthcoming as insurance for
computer incidents becomes more mainstream.
Overall, seven of the eight hypotheses were supported.
Alleged offenders within the workplace differed from those
outside the workplace in a number of ways. They were gener-
ally significantly older, and while offenders were more likely
to be men, women offended in the workplace significantly
more than outside the workplace. Offences inside the work-
place were less likely to require technical expertise, instead
relying on the presented opportunities, and were most likely
to involve data or system breaches. In line with Leukfeldt et
al.’s [29] findings, they were more likely to be local, with the
offences, victims and offenders all being within the UK. As the
Internet allows offenders to cross borders with ease, this may
indicate that cybercrimes without an international component
are more likely to be investigated and prosecuted. They are
also significantly less likely to involve co-offending.
When it comes to sentencing, offenders within the work-
place are less likely to receive a custodial sentence. However,
the hypothesis that those within the workplace who do re-
ceive a custodial sentence receive a shorter sentence was not
supported, as there was no significant difference in sentence
length. This may be due to involvement in other crimes, such
as the police officer who was passing information to criminal
associates and involved in supplying drugs.
As private organisations make up a smaller proportion of
the crimes recorded by the CCCD than might be expected,
this indicates that they may be less likely to be victimised, less
likely to detect or report these matters to the police, or that
they may resolve them internally rather than through public
prosecution. Equally, police agencies may be more likely to
detect and prosecute misuse of their systems due to the well-
established, legally mandated frameworks for accountability,
redress and dealing with internal misconduct which they have
developed as a public service over the past several decades.
As the public generally have no choice when it comes to
government agencies holding data about them, the increased
willingness of police and other public bodies to formally
prosecute insider misuse of data is not misguided.
This analysis supports the overarching hypothesis that in-
work and out-of-work offending for cybercrime constitute
different kinds of offending, with different offenders, pathways
and characteristics. The literature on cybercrime offending
suggests that association with deviant online subcultures are
important for some kinds of cybercrime, providing potential
offenders means to attain status and monetary goals from
which they feel blocked, to enrol co-offenders and to learn
more advanced technical skills and specialise. The research
presented here supports this, suggesting that this may be
particularly important for cybercrimes committed outside the
workplace. Much of the literature on white-collar crime con-
tends that it is an adaptation to a different kind of strain,
and our research suggests that this is the case for ‘in-work‘
cybercrime offences, distinguished by the different opportunti-
ties for offending and cultures of different organisations [20].
Cultural factors and the interactions between individuals and
the expectations, norms and moral economy of the different
social environments they inhabit is likely to play an important
role in shaping patterns of cybercriminal offending. This
implies that the drivers for offenders involved in different kinds
of computer-based offending may not be so different to those
in the pre-Internet era.
A limitation in the research design is that the database only
contains publicly reported cases that have come to the attention
of the criminal justice system. This provides an overview of
cybercrimes that have been prosecuted, but not offences that
have not been reported. For example, the characteristics of
some offenders or offence types may mean they are more
likely to be investigated or prosecuted. Furthermore, some
employers may be more likely to take internal action, without
reporting the matter to the police. Furthermore, cases relating
to sensitive security and intelligence material are not made
available in the public domain. However, this research does
allow for some conclusions to be drawn about what is missing
from the data, particularly for the organisation types that
appear to be less likely to report internal misuse to police.
Future work will involve consulting with academics in-
ternationally to set up similar databases in other countries.
Having equivalent data collection mechanisms and capturing
similar variables will allow for comparative studies across
multiple jurisdictions. Comparative studies can be used to
identify how cybercrime differs across countries, and identify
potential variables that affect this, such as economic and policy
differences. Cybercrime is increasingly an international issue,
and this should be reflected in the data.
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